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INTRODUCTION
Democracy gives citizens choices. Different candidates and policies provide
voters with many different options. Voting rights give people a say in how they will be
governed. We hope voters will recognize the best candidate or policy, and then vote for it.
Psychological research, however, suggests this does not always occur. People have
varying levels of knowledge and intelligence on many topics. While people recognize the
wide range of knowledge and ability levels present in society, David Dunning and Justin
Kruger discovered that people tend to have overly optimistic views of their own social
and intellectual capabilities. Most people rank their own abilities as average or aboveaverage when compared to others, while this is not actually the case. The knowledgeperception gap makes most people poor judges of what they themselves know and what
other people know.1
Since most people cannot see the flaws in their own knowledge, chances are high
they will not know when they are voting for bad policies. Similarly, if a voter cannot
judge how much someone else knows about a particular topic, he is unlikely to make an
informed choice about different political candidates.2 Democratic societies encompass
people with a range of different abilities. Certain people can be very good or very bad at
different things. If we know that someone will be particularly bad at judging her own and

1

Justin Kruger and David Dunning, "Unskilled and Unaware of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One's
Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 77
(1999).
2
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others’ levels of expertise, why would we allow that person to vote? It seems likely that
she would make a bad decision.
Based on this type of analysis, Jason Brennan builds a case for requiring citizens
to prove their competence in order to vote. His article ―The Right to a Competent
Electorate‖ presents an argument that requiring citizens to pass an examination in order
to vote will create a better electorate. To persuade people who believe citizens have a
fundamental right to vote, Brennan aims to demonstrate that restricting the electorate is
not unjust – or at least, less unjust than universal suffrage, or granting the entire
population the right to vote.
The first chapter of this thesis will explain Brennan’s argument, as well as some
objections to it. That chapter concludes by looking at Brennan’s comparison of universal
and restricted suffrage, in which he argues that restricting the electorate is a more just
system than one of universal suffrage. In the second chapter, I explore some objections to
the moral acceptability of voter examinations. I will again compare the injustice of
restricting the electorate to that of universal suffrage. This thesis aspires to show why
Brennan’s initial considerations are not all-encompassing. Once I have demonstrated
which major considerations Brennan missed I will include them as factors to weigh when
deciding which system of suffrage is more unjust. Adding this new set of factors leads me
to conclude restricted suffrage is worse than universal suffrage. We should not restrict the
electorate, and instead protect voting rights for all.
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CHAPTER 1
In this chapter, I will examine Brennan’s justification for restricting the electorate.
He compares the electorate to juries in order to gain clarity about who should or should
not vote. In doing so, he makes the case that it is morally unacceptable for people without
knowledge or reasonable moral values to vote. The chapter then explores some objections
to Brennan’s argument. At the end, I put myself in Brennan’s shoes, and consider the
factors he uses to show the larger injustice of universal suffrage. The second chapter will
describe three more damaging objections, then conduct the weighing process again,
considering these factors.
Brennan’s Argument
At the beginning of this section I will clarify some generally accepted notions
about democracy and voting, political power, and the distribution of political power.
These will become important in Brennan’s argument. Then I will sketch how Brennan
aims to illustrate that giving citizens universal voting rights is more unjust than restricting
the electorate.
The right to vote gives citizens political power: a voter decides how he will be
governed. However, voting rights give citizens more power than one traditionally
recognizes: not only does the power to vote give a citizen a say over his own rule, it also
gives her a say over other people.1 The voter holds political power not just over himself,
but also over all others who will be ruled by the result of the process. Brennan agrees
each individual has a right to ―govern and decide‖ for himself, but asserts that one has no
1

Jason Brennan, "The Right to a Competent Electorate." Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming): 4.
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right to govern and decide for others.2 People intuitively accept this idea: each person
believes he has the right to decide where he should live, what job he should hold, and so
on. However, people do not believe he should be able to make decisions about where his
neighbor should work, how his neighbor should spend her free time, and other decisions
about her life. Brennan’s argument hinges on the idea that voters hold power over others.
We might argue against Brennan by straightforwardly stating that votes often
have no consequential significance. Democracies are often large, so that individual votes
seem to have almost no impact on an election’s outcome. This also means that each voter
has only a minimal say over others. I could dismiss Brennan’s concern given that no one
effectively has power over others.
I will not give this response. Instead, I agree with Brennan, who regards political
power, not consequential significance, as the integral piece to consider. Political power
gives a voter the ability to weigh in on decisions about others, and so is morally
significant. Regardless of how much power a voter effectively holds, the mere fact that he
has some amount of power necessitates justification.
If an objector claims that voters do not hold any political power over their fellow
citizens, then restricting voting rights would not disempower anyone.3 Since being
authorized to vote would not give any individual either political or consequential power,
no one who voted would hold power over any others. This, though, does not save
universal suffrage. If voters have political power, we can attempt to justify restricted
suffrage by saying that we should not allow incompetent people to hold power over
others. If voters do not have political power, disenfranchisement does not reduce
2
3

Ibid.
Ibid, 14.
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anyone’s power, and restricting the electorate will produce better outcomes because a
higher percentage of voters are competent. Most people, however, would agree voting
rights give people political power.
If we agree a voter has political power, we must decide how to justly allocate that
power. Typical democracies grant universal voting rights, or voting rights to every citizen
above a certain age. A voter in a traditional democracy may be ignorant, misinformed,
disinterested, irrational, or morally unreasonable, yet can still exercise power over his
fellow citizens.4 Brennan asks how this system can be justified against the same system
with the exclusion of politically incompetent or unreasonable voters.5 Brennan believes
restricting voting rights is the less unjust option.
Jury Comparison
To show the injustice of universal voting rights, Brennan compares voting to jury
service. Since people generally accept the reasoning behind jury selection, Brennan
attempts to create an analogy between juries and governments. If he can successfully
create a parallel between the two, this will help to justify restricted voting rights. If he can
demonstrate similarities between juries and electorates, he will have grounds for
subjecting the two institutions to similar standards.
A jury holds significant power over the defendant and can deprive him of his
property, liberty, and in some cases, life. Juries make high-stakes decisions about other
people’s lives. Governments, in Brennan’s view, hold these same powers over their
4

Throughout this thesis I will discuss reasonable and unreasonable morals without giving an account of
what these might be. Brennan does not advocate for a specific view of morality, but believes his theory is
consistent with a number of moral theories, so long as they are reasonable. He does not clearly distinguish
between reasonable and unreasonable morals, but thinks both types exist. I agree with this characterization.
For a fuller discussion, see The Ethics of Voting (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), chapter 5.
5
Brennan, ―The Right to a Competent Electorate,‖ 4.
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citizens. Governmental decisions have two main features, which parallel the features of a
jury’s decision. First, the government has the power to impose its decisions on people
through coercion. All citizens (and others within the government’s domain) are forced to
comply, even if one has valid grounds for non-compliance. Second, these decisions are
significant, often to a large number of people. A government’s decisions impact the lives
of its citizens, and can deprive citizens of their lives, liberty, and property.
Hypothetical Jury Scenarios
Brennan presents three hypothetical jury scenarios to explain their duties and the
ways in which they may make decisions. He uses these examples to illustrate bad juries
and bad decision-making:
1. The Ignorant Jury: The jurists pay no attention during the trial. When asked
to deliberate, they are ignorant of the details of the case, but find the defendant
guilty anyways. After the trial, they admit they decided the case this way (or
we have some other strong source of evidence that this is how they made their
decision).
2. The Irrational Jury: The jurists pay some attention to the details of the case.
However, they find the defendant guilty not on the basis of the evidence, but
on the basis of wishful thinking and various bizarre conspiracy theories they
happen to believe. After the trial, they admit they decided the case this way
(or we have some other strong source of evidence that this is how they made
their decision).
3. The Morally Unreasonable Jury: The jurists find the defendant guilty because
he is Muslim, and they are Christians who think Muslims pervert the Word of
God. After the trial, they admit they decided the case this way (or we have
some other strong source of evidence that this is how they made their
decision).6
Intuitively, many people would judge these juries to have made decisions in an
unacceptable way – the members are either ignorant of the facts, morally unfit to serve,

6
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or use poor decision-making methods. Brennan uses this intuition as groundwork to
describe how to make decisions acceptably.
Competence Principle
These hypothetical jury scenarios help Brennan produce a general principle
stating how to make decisions properly. We require high-stakes jury decisions regarding
the defendant’s life be made by competent people in a competent manner. Based on the
intuitions we have about acceptable procedures and who is competent to decide in jury
cases, Brennan extrapolates this principle:
Competence Principle (CP): It is unjust to deprive a citizen of life,
liberty, or property, or to significantly alter her life prospects by force and
threats of force, as a result of decisions made by an incompetent or
morally unreasonable deliberative body, or as a result of decisions made in
an incompetent and morally unreasonable way.7
Brennan specifically writes CP in this way to disqualify a number of different people. He
wants to disqualify ―deliberative bodies‖ that are incompetent or morally unreasonable.
This phrase is unclear, but it seems to me this means it is unjust to allow these types of
people to be members of the deliberative body. Specifically, the members cannot have
bad moral character, be incompetent in some relevant way, and/or make decisions using
incompetent or morally questionable methods. This applies even if the members of the
deliberative body are generally competent decision-makers. For the rest of this paper, I
will use ―unacceptable decision-makers‖ to describe this entire set.

7

Ibid, 6.
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Justifying CP in Jury Decisions
To show CP’s general relevance, Brennan must first establish its applicability
within its initial sphere: jury decisions. We cannot justify enforcement of an incompetent
jury decision by showing that most juries are competent.8 Nor can we justify enforcing an
incompetently-made decision simply because the specific members of the jury who
decided the case generally make competent decisions.9 A defendant could rightfully
object to decisions in either of these scenarios.
To begin with a straightforward example, consider a teacher. Most teachers assign
grades properly. A math teacher might teach her students algebra, give the exam, and
grade them fairly. Just because she generally does so does not give her license to assign
grades for a certain exam based not on the number of correct exam answers, but on the
neatness of the student’s handwriting. The same reasoning applies to juries.
It makes no difference if the jury decides correctly or incorrectly (in terms of truth
of the decision) if the jurists decide in unacceptable ways. For example, perhaps a
student’s neatness directly correlated to how many questions he answered correctly. The
teacher would have assigned the verifiably correct grade, but it would not be legitimate
because of the manner in which she assigned it. These decisions, regardless of the
correctness of their outcomes, are unjust and should not be enforced. CP disqualifies
decisions based on the quality of the people deciding and the decision-making process
used, rather than the substantive outcome.10 This process matches our intuitions about the
proper way to make decisions.

8

Ibid.
Ibid, 7.
10
Ibid.
9
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In the United States, the accused are entitled to a fair jury trial of their peers. The
jury selection process implicitly follows CP. People do not serve if they are deemed
incompetent by attorneys for both the prosecution and defendant or by the judge, and
displaying moral bias is one of the ways to be removed from jury service. All trials are
supposed to be conducted by impartial juries, and if it is discovered after the trial that the
jury was corrupt or made its decision incompetently, there is the legal possibility of
overturning the decision.11 For these reasons, CP seems applicable to jury decisions.
Justifying CP’s Broader Use
If we can find relevant similarities between juries and governments, we should
hold them to the same standards. In this case, the standards entail making decisions using
proper methods, not just arriving at correct conclusions. Previously, I demonstrated
pertinent similarities, namely that both governmental and jury decisions hold significant
coercive power over others’ lives. Because of the nature of the decisions, Brennan argues
that governments are comparable to juries. It follows that citizens can demand
competence from their decision-makers. Unacceptable decisions are unjust.12
Despite this argument, most democracies do not utilize CP when establishing
voting rights, even though voters hold the ultimate power in this system of government.13
Voters choose rulers who wield coercive power, and can sometimes vote on legislation
that binds all citizens, without any screening.
However, many governments already implicitly recognize CP elsewhere. Some
public service positions, for example, come with age restrictions or other certifications.
11

Ibid, 9.
Ibid, 10.
13
Ibid, 11.
12
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Requiring certain qualifications for positions of power demonstrates CP in action.14 The
United States Senate must approve presidential appointees to many positions, such as
Supreme Court Justices. In theory, this ensures that appointees are competent for the
positions they will hold.
Brennan’s Conclusions
At this point, I hope to have represented Brennan’s argument as clearly as
possible. He tackles the question of who should hold political power over other people.
He believes that only competent people are qualified to make decisions in the proper
manner. To draw out common intuitions about proper decision-making methods, Brennan
presents some hypothetical jury scenarios, and extrapolates a principle, CP. CP
distinguishes who may make coercive, significant decisions over others’ lives, and the
ways in which they may be made. Brennan believes juries and governments are
relevantly comparable, so CP applies to electoral decisions. This means it is morally
wrong to allow incompetent people to vote.
Objections to Brennan’s Argument
In this section I will explore some objections to Brennan’s argument as a whole.
These objections can be split into three general categories. First, I will consider
Brennan’s comparison between juries and governments, and argue the two institutions are
sufficiently distinguishable. If I can show that this is the case, CP might not apply to
political decisions, even though it would continue to apply to jury decisions. Secondly, I
will consider objections to CP itself, notably to the idea that we must test each individual

14

Ibid, 10.

13

voter for competence. Perhaps the principle only requires that the electorate prove itself
competent as a whole. Finally, I will introduce a principle that, if correct, shows how
restricted suffrage is unjust, like universal suffrage. I will more fully expand this
objection in chapter two, but I raise it here to counterbalance Brennan’s claim that
universal suffrage is more unjust than restricted suffrage.
Problems Comparing Governments to Juries
Earlier, I articulated the reasons why juries and governments function similarly,
namely that both are coercive and the decisions they make significant. They might not,
however, be similar in relevant ways, most notably in their decision-making methods. As
long as I can show a real difference between jury decisions and political decisions, it does
not follow that CP must also apply to governments. I will conclude that only some types
of political decisions are relevantly similar to jury decisions. CP applies only to this
smaller set of political decisions.
CP aims to set a standard of good decision-making. In order to decide whether the
principle should apply to governments in addition to juries, we must look for similarities
between the two decision-making processes. If they are sufficiently different, this might
be grounds for rejecting CP as a principle applicable to governments.
First, though, it is helpful to consider the types of decisions both institutions make.
Juries make coercive decisions that significantly impact the lives of others. The defendant
is either guilty or innocent, so the decisions have a verifiably correct answer. The jury
may decide correctly or incorrectly. Political decisions are much more complicated.
Certain political decisions have right and wrong answers. Votes on economic policy fit
this distinction: a certain monetary policy will grow the economy by five percent, while
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another will grow it by one percent. In this case, one must pick the former to choose the
right policy.15
Some political decisions, though, do not have a right answer. Decision-makers
must appeal to their own values in order to choose an option. Security decisions often fall
into this category. Security requires tradeoffs. We can implement more stringent security
procedures that infringe slightly on citizens’ basic liberties, but tend to ensure people’s
safety, or we can protect basic liberties by refusing to impose certain procedures, even if
doing so decreases safety. Here it is reasonable to think that neither decision is right or
wrong; rather, each person must appeal to her own values to decide.
The same distinctions apply whether voters choose policies or candidates. In some
cases, such as when one candidate wants to implement racist or sexist policies, there is a
wrong decision. Most candidates do not hold such extreme views, though, and so any
choice is reasonable. Democratic and Republican candidates promote different economic
policies and prioritize different civil rights. There is sometime not an objectively correct
choice between two candidates. How should voters vote? Brennan argues people should
vote for whatever they justifiably believe will best promote the common good.16 I agree,
but I would argue that here either vote could fulfill that motive. I think he would agree
with my assessment. So in this scenario the voter must appeal to something else. Personal
preference, values, and other things that contribute to one’s political beliefs will help to
determine one’s vote in this case, and a voter is justified in looking to those elements
provided neither candidate advocates for wrong policies and so would be a wrong
decision.
15
16

Brennan argues for this position in The Ethics of Voting, 128.
Ibid, 133.
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Furthermore, some political decisions do not matter in the way jury decisions do.
In order for CP to apply, the decision’s outcome must significantly impact other people’s
lives. While nearly all jury decisions fit this standard, not all political decisions do.
Consider a scenario in which a municipality must decide how to spend its recreational
funds. The funds have already been allocated to the specific department, and must be
spent within the calendar year. Someone must decide: will the town build a basketball
court or a swimming pool? This decision should not be construed to significantly impact
anyone’s life or life prospects, and so decision-makers should not be subject to the
regulations of CP in decisions of this level of importance. Brennan does not mention this
constraint, so it should be noted that CP only applies to decisions with a certain level of
significance to others.17
There are clear distinctions between decisions the two institutions make. Juries
are entrusted with determining the guilt or innocence of the defendant, and must do so by
applying the facts of the case to the law. At least in theory, there is a correct application
of the facts, and so a correct outcome. In contrast, political decisions may have a right
answer, or may not. Some political decisions simply require a decision-maker to choose
from a reasonable set of options, and to do so it is acceptable for her to appeal to her own
values to come to a decision. Certain political decisions do not significantly impact
anyone’s life. So the principle does not apply to all political decisions. It only applies to
the smaller subset comparable to jury decisions: political decisions that have a right
answer, rather than a reasonable one, and with outcomes that significantly impact the
17

This might create questions about which voting decisions actually matter. This is easy to answer at the
extremes: clearly questions about punishment affect others’ lives in significant ways, while those about
which recreational facility to build do not. There may be some grey area regarding how to distinguish
significant decisions from non-significant ones, but I will not consider that here.
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general population. Since not all political decisions fit this characterization, I have
narrowed CP’s scope significantly.
Objecting to CP
Although I have confined CP’s application to a smaller set of political decisions, I
remain unsatisfied with the principle. Specifically, I do not believe Brennan establishes
whether CP applies to groups or individuals. CP requires ―deliberative bodies‖ to make
decisions in the proper manner, but it is unclear if Brennan means to say each member of
the deliberative body must pass the requirement, or if it is meant for the group as a whole.
If I can show CP only applies to groups, rather than individuals, some number of
incompetent people might be allowed into decision-making groups, as long as the groups
as a whole continue to follow proper decision-making procedures.
In order to determine how to apply CP, Brennan returns to juries. He thinks if a
twelve-member jury found a black defendant guilty, but it contained five racists and
seven morally upstanding members, the moral composition of the jury would undermine
the its authority.18 The defendant is entitled to an unbiased jury trial, even if an unbiased
jury would come to the same conclusion as a jury with some morally unreasonable
members. Many would argue that the decision from a jury with morally unreasonable
members should not hold, even if the members come to the right conclusion.19
If a twelve-member jury contains one morally unreasonable member who does
not participate in the discussion, was the decision made in an improper way? Perhaps not,
18

Brennan, ―The Right to a Competent Electorate,‖ 14.
This idea is similar to one Robert Nozick advocates regarding punishment. His principle requires that an
individual be in the ―best feasible position‖ to ascertain a defendant’s guilt, and correctly given punishment
from some other position is morally wrong. Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basic Books, 1974), 105-107.
19

17

even if he convicted the defendant on racial grounds rather than facts about the case, as
the rest of the jury did. Maybe this jury’s decision cannot be overturned on morally
illegitimate grounds even though it contained a morally incompetent member, and so we
accept it. On the other hand, perhaps society simply does not want racist people to serve
on juries, regardless of whether their views influence the jury’s decision as a whole.
Applying CP to the entire jury would not rule out juries with one racist member, but
individually applying CP would prevent one racist from serving on a jury with eleven
morally upstanding members. In Brennan’s example, five members of the jury, which is
not a majority, would convict based on morally inappropriate grounds, but the minority
may have influenced others on the jury to vote in specific ways. Brennan would argue
that their subpar moral character creates an unacceptable jury, perhaps because we can
never be sure of a racist jurist’s motives. Once again, maybe this is not the issue. If the
five racists deliberate separately from the seven non-racists, and each group comes
individually to the same conclusion, the racist jurists cannot be accused of influencing the
morally upstanding ones. Still, the racists’ presence on the jury does not intuitively sit
well. Although we do not have clear intuitions here, it seems that people with
unreasonable morals should not be allowed to make these kinds of decisions.
It is not clear exactly where we should draw the line between allowing one
morally unreasonable member of a jury to participate in determining the right answer for
the wrong reasons and invalidating the jury’s decision because there are too many
morally unreasonable members.20 Here Brennan seems to argue that correct procedures

20
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outweigh correct outcomes: even if a jury with five racist members comes to the correct
decision, the procedure invalidates it.
I can only hypothesize how he concludes this. It seems plausible to justify such
thinking by saying each decision made in an improper manner creates a small injustice.
While one poorly-made decision does not tip the scales significantly, many small
injustices add up to a great injustice, one too large to be tolerable. When aggregating
injustices, Brennan seems to think there is some percentage of the deliberative body as a
whole that may use poor methods. Once the number of people using improper procedures
reaches a critical mass, the aggregated injustice outweighs other concerns, and so
Brennan deems the body unacceptable. Given his five racist jurists on a twelve-person
jury example, it is clear this percentage may be a minority. However, he never specifies
whether it must be a sizable minority (such as he demonstrated) or whether a significantly
lower proportion of a given body (say, 5%) would also render the entire body
unacceptably incompetent. It seems reasonable to me to say that some critical mass of
incompetent people, while still in the minority, would render the entire body’s decision
unacceptable. I agree that one incompetent member of a twelve-person jury (and so
perhaps 5% of the entire electorate) would probably not matter, but having five racist
members (or an incompetent 49% of the electorate) would render the decision invalid
because of procedural concerns. The critical mass tipping point would fall somewhere in
the middle.
Although it is possible we would not have to apply some CP test to each
individual voter, we must have some way of ensuring the proportion of people using
unacceptable procedures stays below the threshold of acceptability. Perhaps we could test

19

some segment of the electorate as a representative sample. If the percentage of
unacceptable decision-makers fell below the threshold, society would grant all citizens
voting rights. If we could not rely on a representative sample, perhaps the only way to
adequately enforce CP would be to test each voter.
Brennan does not clearly argue that CP should apply to individuals. It seems that
there might be some low threshold of incompetent voters that we would reasonably allow,
and so we could apply the principle to the electorate as a whole. I cannot, however,
definitively conclude this is the case. To present Brennan’s position favorably, I will
grant him the right to apply CP to each individual. Doing so would create the most
competent electorate possible.
Restricted Suffrage is Also Unjust
David Estlund argues restricted suffrage is unjust. The next chapter details the
objection more thoroughly, but I mention it since it is an integral piece in Brennan’s
comparison of restricted and universal suffrage. Each person has the right to make
decisions about himself. Estlund would permit someone to make coercive decisions about
another’s life only if he has reasonable justification for doing so. He formulates this
principle:
Qualified Acceptability Requirement (QAR): no one [should have] authority or
legitimate coercive power over another without a justification that could be
accepted by all qualified points of view.21

21

David M. Estlund, Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 2008), 33. Estlund also formulates the QAR this way: ―political authority must be justifiable in terms
that are beyond qualified rejection, though not necessarily beyond all actual rejection,‖ (Democratic
Authority, 34) and I believe this articulation is clearer, but I use the former in the text since Brennan refers
to it.
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I will present the full argument for this in the next chapter. For now, I hope the
following example will demonstrate the requirement adequately.
Derek knows the Constitution by heart but has never been exposed to the
principles of economics. His society disqualifies incompetent voters, but we could
consider different yet equally reasonable factors when disqualifying people. I
might believe Derek would make a competent voter based on his Constitutional
knowledge, but my friend might want to disqualify him because he lacks any
economic knowledge. Both views are reasonable, and both of us could reasonably
object to the other: I might not think economic knowledge is essential to voting,
and my friend could think the same about Constitutional recollection. So we
cannot agree whether Derek would be a competent voter. However, both of us
realize that the other’s justification for allowing Derek to vote is reasonable, so it
would be legitimate for him to vote.
Brennan accepts Estlund’s arguments showing how restricted suffrage is unjust
and morally objectionable.22 I will return to these points later, but now that I have
sketched Estlund’s rejection of restricted suffrage, I will flesh out Brennan’s argument by
attempting to weigh the justness of restricted suffrage against universal voting rights.
Weighing Justice
Brennan does not believe that democracy is as just as it could be, and wants to
examine the most feasible just allocation of political power. He aims to prove that
universal suffrage is more unjust and morally worse than restricted suffrage. As I outlined
above, Estlund believes restricted suffrage violates QAR, and so is unjust. If we accept
22
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both Brennan’s and Estlund’s arguments, as well as the objections I have laid out in this
chapter, at this point we can conclude:
1. Democracy, as it is generally practiced, is unjust because it violates CP.
2. A restricted electoral system in which only those who can prove competence are
allowed to vote would be unjust because it would violate QAR.23
Brennan and Estlund have established that both universal and restricted suffrages are
unjust. If there is no third option, which is the better alternative? Brennan claims, ―the
way in which democracy violates the Competence Principle is intrinsically worse than the
way in which [restricted suffrage violates QAR].‖24 Brennan equates universal suffrage to
the unjustness of improperly made jury decisions. Meanwhile, he believes restricting
voting rights is as unjust as imposing voting age requirements. Generally, people find
poorly made jury decisions more repulsive than voting age restrictions. Jury decisions
made in an incompetent manner are morally objectionable, even if the jury makes the
correct decision anyway. Most countries, though, impose voting age restrictions, and
although they might be slightly unjust, the rules do not create a terrible injustice. This
sums up his primary argument for restricting the electorate.
Implicitly, Brennan makes a secondary argument for restricted suffrage. He
believes a restricted electorate will make empirically better political decisions than a
system of universal suffrage. He uses predicted outcomes to justify restricting the
electorate. These two considerations lead him to conclude restricted voting is the less
objectionable of the two systems. At the very end of this chapter, I will recreate
Brennan’s weighing process. Before I get there, I will detail both arguments.
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A Justice Comparison: Restricted vs. Universal Electorates
Universal suffrage, according to Brennan, is about as unjust as enforcing
unacceptable jury decisions. Universal suffrage violates CP and has serious consequences.
Incompetent and unreasonable people can make decisions about citizens’ lives, liberty,
and property, which will then be enforced by threat of violence. While people are
accustomed to this practice, it is intolerable, just as it would be intolerable in jury trials.
Consider a society that cannot devise a generally acceptable method of
distinguishing between competent and incompetent people. It can only use methods that
people find objectionable. This is not so different from contemporary society. Brennan
wonders how unjust such processes will be. He answers, ―[i]t depends on how good our
[process] is, and on how well we can provide evidence that the [process] is a good one.
The better we can show that the [process] tracks the real difference between competence
and incompetence, the less objectionable it is‖ and, implicitly, the less unjust it will be.25
To determine the level of injustice done by excluding citizens using some process,
Brennan suggests comparing it to existent laws excluding some citizens from voting.
Most countries have age restrictions on voting, justifying them by saying children are not
competent to rule. However, voting age restrictions are subject to Estlund’s objection: a
reasonable person could object to any set age. Reasonable people accept that most
children would be incompetent voters, and most adults must put in some effort in order to
vote competently. These same reasonable people recognize the gradual evolution from
childhood incompetency to potential adulthood competence, which generally occurs late
in adolescence. Voting age laws do not perfectly correlate to the transition, which occurs
25
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on an individual basis. Instead, it draws a clear distinction at age sixteen, or eighteen, or
some other arbitrary number, creating two classes of citizens: those who may vote (and
so rule) and those who may not.
Unless the law sets the voting age extremely low, to account for child prodigies,
this distribution of political power fails QAR.26 Setting the age arbitrarily high (at, say,
sixteen) would disqualify educated fifteen year olds and child prodigies from voting. In
this scenario, some person could reasonably object to allowing most, but not all, qualified
people to vote. Setting the bar low enough to account for child prodigies (say, age two),
would potentially violate CP. Not all two year olds are knowledgeable enough to vote, or
even have the cognitive functions necessary to be able to make competent decisions.
Generally, allowing children to vote violates CP.
Brennan claims a disqualification process would approximate the level of
injustice that voting age laws currently impose on citizens. Like voting age laws, this
process would attempt to track the real distinction between competent and incompetent
people and competently- and incompetently-made decisions. This distinction is real,
morally significant, and generally accepted by reasonable people. Just like age
restrictions, it would fall short of actually tracking the distinction, so some reasonable
people would object to the process.27
Brennan then advances a principled argument regarding the injustice of universal
voting rights. He claims:
1. While both A) voting age laws and B) enforcing decisions by incompetent juries
or ones made incompetently are unjust, B is a greater injustice than A.
26
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2. Restricting voting rights using demonstrable competence is about as unjust as A.
3. Universal suffrage is about as unjust as B.
4. Universal suffrage is a greater injustice than restricted suffrage.28
Restricted suffrage creates two classes of citizens ―based on a distinction that all
reasonable people can accept in the abstract‖ but about which there is much reasonable
disagreement in actuality.29 Universal suffrage is comparable to blindly enforcing jury
decisions, even with evidence that they have been made using unacceptable methods or
by incompetent people. People care much more about using poor methods when making
jury decisions than preventing some competent young people from voting. The former
feels like a much larger injustice than the latter. Therefore, Brennan concludes universal
suffrage is more unjust.30
Outcomes
We know, based on present research, what current voters are like: good voters hold
systematically different beliefs than bad voters, many people do not understand which
economic policies will benefit them, people often vote for incumbents, etc.31 Meanwhile,
we do not have empirical evidence about what decisions a restricted electorate would
make. The current voting bloc has great potential for improvement, but we do not know
what actual improvements would come about.32 Brennan implicitly presents a second
argument in favor of restricting the electorate: he believes this restricted group will make
better political decisions than the universal electorate. Further, he claims better outcomes,
at some point, trump voting justice, stating, ―it is better to produce just outcomes in an
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unjust way that to produce unjust outcomes in a just way.‖33 So not only will the
restricted electorate produce better political decisions, it produces exactly what Brennan
is aiming for: the best feasible outcomes using somewhat just procedures, rather than
fully just procedures.
Looking Ahead
Brennan considers two major justifications for restricted suffrage: he believes it is
less unjust than a system of universal suffrage, and he thinks the restricted electorate
would make empirically better decisions. These two points lead him to conclude that
restricted suffrage is a better system than universal suffrage. I will show, however, that
Brennan leaves out some important considerations of procedural justice. In the next
chapter I will expand upon Estlund’s objection and offer my own. I will attempt to bring
both QAR and CP into alignment with how they would be applied in current voting
systems.
After fleshing out these objections, I will reconsider Brennan’s attempt to weigh
restricted suffrage against universal suffrage. I argue that even if he is correct in his initial
attempt, the new factors will tip the scales in the opposite direction.
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CHAPTER 2
In the last chapter I presented Brennan’s argument for restricting the electorate.
As a reminder, he used the Competence Principle to motivate his position:
Competence Principle (CP): It is unjust to deprive a citizen of life,
liberty, or property, or to significantly alter her life prospects by force and
threats of force, as a result of decisions made by an incompetent or
morally unreasonable deliberative body, or as a result of decisions made in
an incompetent and morally unreasonable way.1
Before I can present objections to restricting the electorate, I must investigate what that
group looks like. The simplest, although certainly not the only, way to distinguish the
competent from the incompetent would be to use a voting exam. Brennan does not fully
outline what a potential voting exam would entail, so I begin this chapter by filling in the
holes. I will attempt to construct the most feasible and comprehensive voting exam
possible, in order to disqualify as many incompetent voters as I can. Brennan only states
that an exam might test ―generally relevant basic social science and basic knowledge
about the candidates‖ in order to exclude badly incompetent people from participating.2
He stresses that this kind of exam is not the only way to attempt to enforce CP, but he
considers only this because he deems it most practical.3
Requiring potential voters to know basic facts about the voting process and
political system would produce a more informed electorate. An exam would test voters
on factual knowledge: what the president’s job is, how a Senator filibusters, and how
many states must ratify a Constitutional amendment. The test would also include
economic concepts – perhaps potential voters would be required to identify different
1
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taxation systems, and would have to prove they knew how to apply specific concepts to
real-life problems. These questions would test voters’ comprehension of the political
system and relevant economic concepts, and ensure that voters could apply their
knowledge in the voting booth.
Testing a potential voter’s knowledge of specific candidates requires different
questions. Questions in this section would ask about a specific candidate’s policy
positions on issues of local and national importance. For example, a voter would be
required to accurately characterize candidates’ views on illegal immigration, higher
education funding, small business incentives, affirmative action and a host of other issues,
depending on one’s voting district.
To pass the exam, a potential voter must answer a certain percentage of questions
correctly. An acceptable percentage could be set at the state or federal level. Local
officials would administer the exams at designated testing centers to protect against
cheating. The exams would be available up to and on election day, and as long as a voter
passed the exam he would be allowed to vote.
What Comes Next?
Now that I have considered what a voting examination might look like, I will
show that such examinations are unfair to administer. First, I will return to Estlund’s
QAR objection from the previous chapter, and provide the full argument for that principle.
In turn, the QAR motivates my own objection to applying voting exams. I argue such
examinations are unacceptably discriminatory and unfair. At the end of the chapter, I will
weigh the justness of restricting the electorate again, keeping these factors in mind.
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Estlund’s Objection to Restricted Suffrage: The Qualified Acceptability
Requirement
In chapter one, I mentioned David Estlund’s objection to restricted suffrage. I will
articulate his full view here. To argue against restricted suffrage, Estlund first presents
the strongest argument for that position, then aims to reject the final premise.4 Estlund
provides the following justification for restricted suffrage:
1. The Truth Tenet: There are true, procedure-independent normative standards by
which political decisions should be judged.
2. The Knowledge Tenet: Some people know more of these than other people.
3. The Authority Tenet: Those who know more are justified in having political
authority over others.5
If these three premises are true, they justify restricted suffrage. Estlund grants that the
first two tenets are difficult to deny.6 Instead, he proposes rejecting the authority tenet.
He says that reasonable people cannot agree on who knows best, and so the authority
tenet does not apply. If he can do that, he will have denied a major justification for
restricted suffrage, since the argument in support of restricted suffrage relies on this third
step.
Rejection of the Authority Tenet
One might intuitively think Estlund will reject the authority tenet by appealing to
the ―expert/boss fallacy.‖ This fallacy states one person may have greater knowledge
about a topic than the rest, but that alone is not sufficient to justify granting him any
4
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power, let alone greater power than others.7 This idea is accepted in everyday life:
although my doctor may know better than I do what I should eat, I still decide what to put
into my body each day. I do not grant my doctor power over my decisions regarding what
to eat, even though his knowledge is greater than mine. So it seems that we do not use or
accept the authority tenet in everyday life. This is not, however, the tactic Estlund uses to
oppose the authority tenet. Nevertheless, Brennan’s response to Estlund attempts to
correct this fallacy, so I mention it here.
Instead, Estlund appeals to the idea of reasonable objections to undermine the
authority tenet. A reasonable objection is one that people would acknowledge as
reasonable, even if they themselves do not agree with it and even if the objection is
wrong. An example is helpful here. Imagine a road trip, during which the three
participants want to travel from Chicago to San Francisco. Person A wants to stop in
Boise along the way, while B would prefer to stop in Salt Lake City, and C would rather
visit Las Vegas. There is no one correct route to drive from Chicago to San Francisco.
Even if there is one correct answer about where to visit – perhaps one of the cities is
directly on the line of best fit between Chicago and San Francisco – all of these options
the cities are a reasonable distance between the starting and ending points. That makes
them acceptable route choices for the drive. If C had wanted to stop in Akron, the others
could reasonably object to his request, since it does not fit inside the generally accepted
range of places to visit. In this case, traveling to Akron is unreasonable because San
Francisco is west of Chicago, and Akron is east of Chicago.8
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Distinguishing between reasonable and unreasonable objections is central to
Estlund’s view. He argues a person can only have coercive power over another if there
are no reasonable objections to the justification of his power. It is wrong to make
coercive decisions concerning others if there could be reasonable objections to the
decision. As Estlund formally puts it:
Qualified Acceptability Requirement (QAR): no one [should have]
authority or legitimate coercive power over another without a justification
that could be accepted by all qualified points of view.9
One should not hold coercive power over others unless he can reasonably justify it to the
set of all reasonable people.10 QAR does not require that decision-makers actually justify
themselves to all qualified points of view, only that one could, in theory, justify one’s
authority to those holding such views. Brennan, along with many other liberal political
philosophers, accepts QAR.11
Implications of QAR for Universal and Restricted Suffrage
Estlund asserts that restricted suffrage does not pass QAR, and so is not justified.
He thinks that universal voting rights do pass the requirement, and so can be justified.12 If
he is correct in applying QAR to both systems of suffrage, he will have a strong case for
rejecting the authority tenet. Since the argument for restricted suffrage relies on the
authority tenet, its rejection undermines this system’s justification.
To meet QAR, each step of the argument must be justifiable to reasonable people.
If any reasonable objection arises at any point, the entire justification for restricted
9

Estlund, Democratic Authority, 33.
Ibid, 45-53.
11
Brennan, ―The Right to a Competent Electorate,‖ 19.
12
I will not discuss this point, since QAR establishes the unjustness of restricted suffrage, and CP has
already shown the same thing about universal suffrage. For Estlund’s defense, see Democratic Authority,
36-67.
10

31

suffrage is subject to this objection. So objecting to any step of the argument for
restricted suffrage amounts to a violation of QAR.
Previously, Estlund acknowledged (1) and (2) are difficult to deny. It seems (3)
naturally follows. If reasonable people agree on (2) in that they think more
knowledgeable people exist, then (3) does naturally follow, justifying restricted suffrage.
If, however, reasonable people agree that knowledgeable people exist, but cannot agree
on how to identify such people, then we cannot apply (3) in reality. If all reasonable
people cannot reasonably agree on who is knowledgeable, the authority tenet does not
even come into play – experts cannot have more power because all reasonable points of
view cannot agree on who the experts are.13 This claim holds no matter what method of
distinction is used (in other words, although a voter examination is not the only method to
split the two groups, people will disagree about the split even if we use another
method).14 The authority tenet would restrict voting rights to those who know more about
politics. Restricting the electorate divides citizens into two classes – one with power, one
without – in a way that is not acceptable to all reasonable points of view. The argument
passes QAR in theory, but fails it in practice, and so restricted suffrage cannot be
reasonably justified in reality.
Brennan’s Response
Brennan recognizes Estlund’s rejection of the authority tenet is a major blow to
restricted suffrage’s justification. To revive the argument, Brennan substitutes his own
third tenet in place of Estlund’s. Brennan realizes, as I pointed out above, that the

13
14

Estlund, Democratic Authority, 34-36.
Brennan, ―The Right to a Competent Electorate,‖ 20.

32

authority tenet commits the expert/boss fallacy. His suggestion does not, so Brennan
believes it justifies restricted suffrage. He formulates what he believes is a more intuitive
principle:
3a. The Anti-Authority Tenet: When some citizens are morally unreasonable,
ignorant, or incompetent about politics, this justifies not granting them political
authority over others.15
This tenet provides a basis for disqualification from political authority; instead of arguing
that those with more knowledge should be bosses, Brennan argues that those with little
knowledge should not rule over others. Brennan’s response solves the earlier problem
with the expert/boss fallacy – he does not try to give power to the more knowledgeable
among us. Rather, he tries to take it away from those who are obviously incapable. While
this might seem like the exact opposite of the authority tenet (and so not change much),
Brennan thinks otherwise. It seems to me he attempts to reconcile two conflicting ideas:
the right each person has to make decisions about her own life, and the wrongness of
allowing incompetent people to hold power over others. Brennan tries to split the
difference: the anti-authority tenet is meant to disqualify incompetent people from
making decisions about others’ lives. It allows all other people to make their own
political decisions, which also happens to grant them some measure of power over others.
The authority tenet, in contrast, prescribes who is allowed to make coercive decisions,
full stop. Since incompetent people exist, QAR does not obviously defeat (3a). However,
it also does not directly address Estlund’s objection to the authority tenet, so Estlund
might still be able to defeat (3a).
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Estlund’s Possible Response
Estlund does not directly respond to Brennan’s claim, but based on his earlier
writings, I will attempt to articulate his potential views. It seems Estlund’s earlier
rejection of the authority tenet would also work against Brennan’s anti-authority tenet.
Just as all reasonable points of view cannot agree on who the authority figures are, the
same line of argument applies to incompetent people. There is no easy way to distinguish
a competent voter from an incompetent voter; reasonable people will distinguish the two
in different ways, just as they will distinguish who the experts are in different ways.
Estlund would reject the anti-authority tenet in the same way he rejected the authority
tenet, and would not agree to Brennan’s modified justification of restricted suffrage.
However, Brennan and Estlund, as reasonable people, would agree that there is a
set of people so incompetent that no one could have a reasonable objection to
disqualifying their votes. Just as reasonable people will argue over whether a specific
person at the margin is an expert, they will also argue at the margin of incompetence.
However, QAR allows for a set of people so far below any incompetence line that there
will not be any reasonable objections. So disenfranchising the set of obviously
incompetent people will not violate QAR. Brennan could revise his argument for
restricted suffrage by deploying a more specific principle, such as:
3b. The Unarguably Incompetent Tenet: When some citizens are so far below the
incompetence line that reasonable people should agree they are morally
unreasonable, ignorant, or incompetent about politics, this justifies not granting
the incompetent citizens political authority over others.
This seems like a good way to avoid violating QAR.
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The Subjugation Worry
Disenfranchising extremely incompetent people might create a permanent, nonvoting class. Even if Brennan can justify restricted suffrage, it might be reasonable to
object to a system with such a class, although we accept that all the members of that class
are incompetent. Recall that people have the right to vote in part because it allows them
to make decisions about their own lives. Disenfranchisement strips a citizen of this right,
so permanent disenfranchisement strips a citizen of this right forever. This seems more
troublesome than temporary subjugation.
I emphasize permanence since there are real differences between intermittent and
permanent subjugation. Traditional democracy intermittently subjugates the minority
each time voting takes place. Anyone who voted for a losing proposition or candidate
must submit to the majority’s rule. We do not consider this unjust; it is simply how the
process works.
Even permanent subjugation might not be wrong. If I vote with the minority in
every election, the majority always subjugates me. This does not seem wrong. I am still
able to vote and express my preferences; I simply have the bad fortune that my views do
not align with those of the majority. Permanent disenfranchisement, though, leaves me no
choices. Restricting my voting rights eternally is a more significant injustice than
temporary subjugation, or even temporary restriction.
Permanent disenfranchisement wrongs the subjugated class. Unless we can justify
the subjugation, it is intuitively unfair to always make decisions for others. Brennan’s
argument in favor of subjugating incompetent people relies on the idea that it is unfair to
give those incompetent people a say over others. Restricting incompetent people’s voting
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rights might be unjust, since it prevents them from making political decisions about
themselves. Brennan believes allowing incompetent people to hold power over others
outweighs that consideration. However, it seems much more unjust to permanently
disenfranchise a citizen than to subjugate her temporarily, since the first scenario means
she will never contribute to political decisions that significantly affect her.
Permanently subjugating some citizens will prove troubling when I include it as a
factor to consider later. I believe permanent disenfranchisement might violate QAR.
More troublesome, though, is the thought that it is especially unjust to strip people
forever of the right to make one kind of decision – voting decisions – about their own
lives than to do so intermittently. Later, I will use the Subjugation Worry to argue that
certain types of voting exams are unjust. This will then be added to the list of factors to
consider when determining which electorate is more just.
The Demographic Objection
One more component is necessary before I articulate an objection to applying
voting exams. This piece will also prove helpful in the final section, in which I consider
new factors. In addition to the possibility of violating QAR, Estlund worries restricting
voting rights will create an electorate with biases. Briefly, the objection hypothesizes that
the portion of the population with the ability to pass the exam may have certain damaging
features that contribute to bad voting. These features outweigh the admitted benefits of
having the baseline level of knowledge required to pass the exam.16 Those who can pass
the exam – the restricted electorate – may disproportionately belong to a certain race,
16
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class, or gender, which means that underrepresented groups might not be able to make
their political desires understood. This is a simple formation of the demographic
objection.
Estlund makes a case for the demographic objection in order to bolster his
argument against restricted suffrage. It is an important point, since Estlund’s QAR
argument requires that there be no way to distinguish between acceptable and
unacceptable voters without there being possible reasonable objections. Brennan believes
that if we could develop an exam that tracked the distinction exactly, there would not be
any qualified objections to the way we distinguish between competent and incompetent
people. Estlund’s demographic objection attempts to show that Brennan underestimates
the range of reasonable objections. He does not anticipate such a wide scope of
objections to the composition of the restricted electorate. Estlund formulates the objection
this way:
Demographic Objection: the educated portion of the populace may
disproportionately have epistemically damaging features that countervail the
admitted epistemic benefits of education.17
It is important to remember that under QAR, this objection holds even if no reasonable
person actually states it. It is enough to violate QAR that a reasonable person could hold
this concern.
Knowledge exams like those I outlined earlier might disproportionately favor
members of a certain race, socioeconomic class, or gender, thus biasing voters towards
those viewpoints. Minority interests might not be appropriately included (based on their
presence in general society) because white voters do not know or care what minorities
17
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would decide politically. Reasonable people might worry about excluding minority
interests, which means such a system would violate QAR.
To combat this worry, Estlund suggests checking to see if the proportion of these
groups is the same in the electorate as their percentages in the general population, and
correcting the imbalance, if there is one. This kind of proportional objection seems to
disappear.18
A more stringent objector, however, could worry about the presence of what
Estlund terms ―empirically latent‖ features, such as racism and sexism, in any restricted
electorate, even one created by perfectly distinguishing the competent from the
incompetent.19 He dismisses the idea of realistically testing for these features, which I
will take up below. He does not dismiss the objection, though, and says that even if it is
impossible to check for the presence of empirically latent features, it is reasonable to
worry about them. Because it is a reasonable objection, it seems any restricted electorate
violates QAR.
He takes the argument one step further, and imagines a person who does not
object to the restricted electorate on the basis of some actual (i.e. present) demographic
distortion, but on the ―ground that there might well be one.‖ 20 Instead of accusing the
restricted electorate of racism, sexism, or some namable damaging feature, the objector
worries that group has some undetectable distorting feature. Estlund calls these appeals to
―conjectural features.‖21
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It seems that his argument is quite strong here: it is not that anyone must accuse
the restricted electorate of having an epistemically damaging feature. Neither must the
restricted electorate actually have any damaging features that we may be able to identify,
although I will explore what happens when we can test for such features. It is enough that
a reasonable person could have such a worry about the restricted electorate to make the
system violate QAR. So if there is any reasonable objection to be made, restricting the
electorate fails QAR, even if we can implement a perfectly accurate test. Electorates can
correct for empirically verifiable objections to their makeup, such as an
underrepresentation of minority voters, but there is no easy corrective method when the
objection is not actual but theoretical. I accept Estlund’s argument as valid and believe in
the absence of empirical proof otherwise, all restricted electorates will fail QAR due to
the possibility of reasonable objections. This is an important point, since it shows all
restricted electorates are unjust.
Exams Do Not Disqualify All Incompetent People
The kinds of exams Brennan advocates do not disqualify all types of unacceptable
voters. CP holds potential voters to a higher standard than mere political knowledge;
competent voters must also have reasonable moral standards and make decisions in a
reasonable manner. Without tests to disqualify all kinds of unacceptable voters, it is not
clear that testing helps to restrict the electorate to people who pass CP. In this section I
will investigate new types of exams that might help to correct for certain omissions, then
evaluate them.
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What Do Traditional Knowledge Exams Miss?
While an exam like the one described at the beginning might test a voter’s
knowledge, it does not take into account a voter’s morals or her decision process when
she casts her ballot. It is possible that a voter is knowledgeable about the election, the
candidates, and the issues at hand in this particular cycle, which we could confirm with
an exam. It is also possible that a voter would pass the exam yet fail to use that
knowledge when voting, and instead use an unacceptable procedure. A voting exam, then,
misses a significant proportion of voters deemed incompetent by CP. While it can test for
knowledge, there is no way to test (or, really, to know) which factors a voter will
consider when she casts her vote.
Creating an Unbiased Electorate
No current exam can test an individual’s thought process while casting her ballot.
Still, in order to rule out as many incompetent people as possible, we could test for
factors that would likely impact one’s voting considerations. For example, we might
worry that racist people will vote using racist motives. It is difficult to weed out racist
people with a questionnaire: racist citizens could simply lie in their responses, then vote
using racist beliefs. But we can reasonably approximate citizens’ moral values, and rule
out at least some morally unreasonable people, by testing them for stereotype biases.
Implicit stereotypes are unconscious, and the perceiver is not aware of their effect.
Negative implicit stereotypes, such as believing women are worse leaders than men,
could impact a voter’s ability to properly weigh his voting options. It might lead him to
vote in an unacceptable manner. Thus, excluding these types of people would help create
a restricted electorate closer to the ideal electorate CP requires. Recall CP stems from
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Brennan’s assessment of three types of unacceptable juries: ignorant, irrational, and
morally unreasonable. As such, there are three corresponding types of incompetent voters.
There are exams we could use to more accurately check for the presence of
implicit biases, which will also prevent self-aware racists from lying on a questionnaire.
This section will discuss implementing currently available tests, and ways to moderate
any implicit stereotypes one might hold. The next section will explore the feasibility of
these tests and evaluate both the implications and moral reasonableness of
implementation.
Implicit stereotypes are generally stable and well-learned.22 This makes them
somewhat easy to evaluate. Psychologists have developed the Implicit Association Test
(IAT) to measure levels of implicit association with certain ideas or groups of people.
Psychologists have shown that people may not say what they truly believe, just as I
worried about when discussing the racism questionnaire. This occurs because they are
either unwilling or unable to do so. Unwilling means that an individual does not want to
admit the correct answer. Unable means that a person is mistaken in his beliefs about
himself. A self-aware racist might be unwilling to give the correct answer about her racist
beliefs, since telling the truth would disqualify her from voting. People who hold implicit
stereotypes about others are unable to properly report on their beliefs. The IAT penetrates
both types of unreported beliefs, and measures implicit attitudes towards specific
groups.23
22

Irene V. Blair, Jennifer E. Ma, and Alison P. Lenton, "Imagining Stereotypes Away: The Moderation of
Implicit Stereotypes Though Mental Imagery" Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 81 (2001):
829.
23
―Background Information,‖ Project Implicit, accessed March 19, 2012,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/index.jsp.
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To measure implicit attitudes, the IAT directs participants to pair two concepts
together. For example, the IAT that measures age preference (old vs. young) requires
participants to pair images and words associated with youth with words associated with
good. Elderly and bad are similarly paired. Then the associations are switched (youth
with bad, elderly with good). The participant takes the IAT on the computer, and each
concept (good vs. bad or old vs. young) has a corresponding keyboard press. He must
quickly press the correct button for the image or word that appears on-screen.
The more closely associated two concepts are in one’s mind, the easier it is to pair
them together, and the quicker one can correctly respond with keyboard presses.24 The
computer program measures the difference in time for different associations, and uses an
algorithm to determine how strong one’s preference is for a particular concept. One can
have a ―slight,‖ ―moderate,‖ or ―strong‖ preference for a particular concept (i.e. old vs.
young, white people vs. black people, male vs. female, etc.). Test results may also
conclude that a participant has ―little to no automatic preference or association.25
The IAT is simple to perform and lasts under fifteen minutes. Current IATs
measure people’s implicit associations about race, skin tone, sexuality, religion, age, and
the gender-career bias.26 At this point, it seems like a good candidate to help societies
exclude biased people. However, one major advantage of the knowledge exam is one’s
ability to improve upon one’s past results. A potential voter may take the test and fail. He
can study to try to improve his score, and if he does attain the necessary score, he will be
24

―FAQs,‖ #2, Project Implicit, accessed March 23, 2012,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/faqs.html.
25
Ibid, #11.
26
―Demo Tests,‖ Projection Implicit, accessed March 12, 2012,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/selectatest.html. The last test often reveals a link between males
and careers and females and family life.
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permitted to vote. Since people do not consciously appeal to implicit stereotypes, they do
not control them. Without control over what is being tested, it seems unlikely someone
would be able to improve his score. So perhaps one will never be able to pass the IAT,
and will be permanently disenfranchised. This creates a subjugation worry like the one I
discussed earlier.
Mental Imagery and Changing One’s Implicit Associations
If people cannot improve their scores on implicit stereotype tests, these exams
would create a permanent underclass of non-voters. Testing for implicit stereotypes, then,
would extend the Subjugation Worry I discussed earlier. However, implicit biases have
shown to be malleable to some extent. Specifically, a study conducted at the University
of Colorado at Boulder concluded that using counterstereotypic mental imagery produced
substantially weaker implicit associations as measured by the IAT.27 This section will
discuss the background of stereotypes, then explain the method the study used to counter
people’s implicit biases. The final section will explore the feasibility of this option.
Mental imagery refers to the conscious and intentional act of creating a mental
representation of a person, object, or event. It has previously been shown to alter both
judgment and behavior in a wide variety of areas, from athletic performance to
intellectual pursuits. Traditional stereotypes refer to the typical or strongest group
association. For example, concepts of warmth, passivity, and dependence are often
associated with females, as well as physical traits like long hair and occupations such as
secretary and nurse. These concepts together form the traditional stereotype of women.

27

This conclusion and the further explanation come from Blair et al.
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The counterstereotype (CS), which characterizes women as strong and independent, is
less easily accessible.
The Colorado study focused on implicit stereotypes surrounding men and women.
The study showed that picturing CS mental images of strong women produced
significantly faster response times during stereotype-inconsistent pairing trials (i.e. when
pairing females with strong characteristics or males with weakness). This was in
comparison to neutral trials in which participants conjured a mental image of a relaxing
beach scene. The second trial demonstrated that producing a stereotypical mental image
of a woman (weak and passive) did not increase one’s implicit bias, but a CS mental
image of a woman (strong) did significantly decrease the participants’ implicit stereotype.
However, in all cases the mean stereotypical response was greater than 0. In other words,
generally people still showed implicit biases against associating women with strong
concepts, although mental imagery lowered the bias.
The study provides strong evidence for the moderating effect of CS mental
imagery on implicit stereotypes. This evidence implies that there is a much stronger link
between explicit processes (mental imagery) and implicit processes (unconscious biases)
than previously thought. While it was already established that implicit stereotypes can
influence one’s actions and judgments, this study shows that explicit strategies may also
influence the implicit stereotypes one holds. If this is the case, then it seems possible for
people who have implicit biases to use mental imagery to mitigate the effects. Depending
on what level of bias society deems acceptable, a citizen might be able to mitigate her
bias enough to reach the level necessary to vote.
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Implementation and Evaluation
Brennan might want to use the IAT to disqualify morally unreasonable voters
from the electorate. To make this a realistic scenario, the state or federal government
would authorize people to vote based on their levels of bias. We might require that people
showed little to no bias between different groups (men vs. women, blacks vs. whites, etc.).
We might also allow people who showed a slight preference for one group over the other
to vote, but disallow those who show a moderate or strong preference in either direction.
In this case people would not have to erase the presence of implicit stereotypes, but
simply mitigate them to an acceptable level.
Potential voters would take the exam that corresponded to the characteristics of
the candidates in that particular election. For example, if one candidate was male and the
other female, potential voters would have to score at least an acceptable level on the
gender differences IAT. If the two candidates were of different racial backgrounds,
potential voters would have to pass the threshold on that specific IAT to vote.
Just like a knowledge exam, if one does not score at an acceptable level on the
IAT, he can retake the exam. People who previously were unable to vote because of the
results of their IATs could use explicit strategies outlined above while retaking the test,
and would potentially reach an acceptable score. Then they would be permitted to vote.
I will now evaluate the feasibility of implementing IATs in order to test people for
implicit biases or biases they are unwilling to share. The exam is available online and
takes under fifteen minutes to complete. It would be fairly simple to direct all potential
voters to an online examination. If he scored within the appropriate range, he could then
vote. Informing people about the opportunity to improve one’s scores would not be any
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more difficult. The same website where people accessed the IAT could also outline the
bias-mitigation strategy. By making the information easily available, the state puts the
power in the hands of the voters, even if it is required that a potential voter score within a
certain range on the exam.
I have established that it would be feasible to implement the IAT as a measure to
disqualify morally unacceptable voters. Next, I will consider the outcomes and
implications of subjecting citizens to such a test. There is a major problem with this
approach: forcing someone to admit that he might be unconsciously biased is mentally
unsettling for that person. I will consider this, then argue that the negatives of
implementation outweigh the benefits.
The Cost of Discovering Implicit Biases
Learning that I am unconsciously racist, sexist, or otherwise biased can take a
great toll on my mental health. Especially if nothing in my personal history suggests that
I might have a bias, finding out about this part of myself could be mortifying. The IAT’s
―Ethical Considerations‖ page discusses potential misuse of the test, and states: ―[P]eople
may use [the IAT] to investigate others' likes and dislikes, causing them harm in the
process. Project Implicit, along with the investigators who have been involved in
developing the IAT, urge careful consideration of costs associated with these possible
misuses in contemplating any applications of the IAT.‖28 The makers of the IAT realize
the potentially damaging thoughts I might have if told I have implicit biases. Add in a
new inability to vote, and I find myself in a deep mental hole. The cost of failure for the

28

―Ethical Considerations,‖ Project Implicit, accessed April 15, 2012,
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/background/ethics.html.
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IAT is much higher than the cost of failure for the knowledge exam. If I fail either of
them, I will not be able to vote, which might cause me unhappiness or shame. If I fail the
knowledge exam, I might feel some further inadequacy for lacking the intellect or recall
to pass. If I do not score at an acceptable level on the IAT, I might feel that my character
has fundamental flaws.
I, the unconscious racist, have a further worry beyond my mental state. If my bias
is strong enough, I might never be able to pass the IAT. With a knowledge exam, if I do
not know the answers, I can study them, which gives me a reasonable chance to pass. But
perhaps I hold extremely strong unconscious biases, and am unable to mitigate them to an
acceptable level.29 In essence, I will never be able to pass the test, and so I will never be
able to vote. If voting is important to me, this is another major mental hurdle. It also
recalls Estlund’s earlier worry that voter exams create a permanent underclass who may
never vote. This returns us to the Subjugation Worry. Perhaps this is not a problem if this
group of people is composed only of overly racist people who cannot mitigate their biases,
since we do not want these kinds of people voting. Still, society often influences people
in unconscious ways, and it might be difficult for many people, especially older people,
to change implicit biases they have held for many years. Generally competent people,
then, would be restricted from voting, perhaps forever, which prevents them from making
political decisions that greatly impact their lives. This might be more unjust than allowing
implicitly biased people to vote, especially if these people proved competent in other
relevant areas.
29

The Blair paper concluded that mental imagery seems to help mitigate one’s implicit biases, but did not
always reduce the implicit bias to zero (the average of all participants’ scores after mental imagery was
statistically non-zero). So it is possible that some people would not be able to mitigate their biases to an
acceptable level, or at least would not be able to do so using this technique.
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So perhaps the IAT is not an acceptable test. Forcing me to potentially discover
that I hold unconscious biases creates fear. Using a test that I may never be able to pass
lacks some element of fairness – I never have a legitimate chance to vote. Brennan does
not consider these factors when weighing the justness of the two electorates. The next
section attempts to rectify his oversights, and reweigh the justness of the two types of
electorates.
Weighing Justice Again
At the end of chapter one, I attempted to demonstrate Brennan’s argument for
restricted suffrage. As a reminder, he realizes that neither system is fully just: universal
voting rights violate CP, while restricted voting rights violate QAR. However, he gives
two arguments that conclude restricting the electorate is preferable to universal voting
rights.
The first argument directly compares the two systems to other decision-making
methods. He equates allowing universal voting rights to the level of injustice found in
unacceptable jury decisions. If the members of a jury are ignorant, incompetent, or
morally unreasonable, their decisions should not be allowed to stand, even if the jury
arrives at the factually correct answer. Meanwhile, he equates restricting the electorate to
voting age requirements, which almost all democracies have already. Voting age
requirements, since they limit voters based on age rather than ability, unjustly prevent
competent people from voting if they are too young. Most people, however, do not
consider this injustice to be very large. Therefore, restricted suffrage is less unjust, and
preferable, to universal suffrage. Brennan does not present a full second argument, but
does suggest that restricted electorates will make empirically better political decisions
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than universal electorates. Better outcomes serve as a secondary justification for
restricting the electorate.
In this section, I will reevaluate universal and restricted suffrage, factoring in the
objections I raised earlier in this chapter. Even if Brennan’s first argument is correct, I
will attempt to show why other considerations lead me to conclude in favor of universal
suffrage. Specifically, I believe there are three major factors Brennan does not fully
consider. First, Brennan’s voting exam only disqualifies ignorant people, which means
some portion of the restricted electorate still votes in way that violates CP. I will argue
that this is both unfair to voters who would be prevented from voting based on their
political knowledge, and that it would create a serious demographic objection. The
second objection is the demographic objection, which serves as a potential refutation to
Brennan’s implicit argument that a restricted electorate will choose empirically better
political decisions. A third, and more subtle, concern that Brennan fails to consider stems
from the Subjugation Worry. Either knowledge exams or moral tests could create a group
of people who could never pass such an exam, and so would never be able to vote. I will
argue such an occurrence might unfairly restrict people’s rights to participate in their own
governance in a more serious way than the intermittent subjugation does.
Why Not Use the IAT?
To follow CP, society must restrict the electorate to knowledgeable, morally
reasonable decision-makers. Using only a knowledge exam allows morally unreasonable
people to vote. A society that wishes to restrict its electorate should use the best available
moral exam. I have made the case for the IAT: it would be simple to implement and
although it cannot directly test what reasons a voter appeals to in the voting booth, it

49

disqualifies implicitly biased people, which closely approximates people with
unreasonable morals. Combining a knowledge exam and the IAT would create a
restricted electorate much closer to the ideal restricted electorate CP requires.
Even though such a combination would produce a better approximation of CP’s
restricted electorate, it is morally unacceptable to use the IAT as a voting exam. As
mentioned before, the makers of the IAT acknowledge learning about one’s implicit
biases can be mentally damaging. Subjecting potential voters to the risk of learning
damaging information about themselves gives voting unacceptably high costs.
Governments cannot justifiably place such requirements on voters, even if doing so
would tend to create a less-biased electorate. Additionally, if it is empirically true that
some people cannot change their implicit biases enough to reach the acceptable level,
they will never be allowed to vote. This creates a subjugation worry I will return to later.
Allowing Morally Unfit Voters is Unfair to Ignorant People
CP shows an injustice occurs each time an ignorant, irrational, or morally
unreasonable person contributes to a coercive decision regarding others’ lives. Brennan’s
suggested voting examination distinguishes ignorant people from those with the requisite
knowledge to vote, but does not distinguish between morally reasonable and
unreasonable people. I have argued against implementing the IAT, which would
disqualify people with unacceptably high levels of implicit bias. While having implicit
biases does not correlate exactly to having unreasonable morals, the former approximates
the latter well enough to make it a useful exam.
I will assume the reader accepts my argument and considers implementing the
IAT wrong. Since it is wrong for society to use the IAT, morally unreasonable people
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may vote, while people who do not pass the knowledge exam may not. Since any type of
incompetent person voting violates CP, allowing morally unreasonable people to vote
unfairly disadvantages people with low knowledge.
Even if someone rejects my argument against the IAT, and implements the test, I
believe the form of the argument is still correct. My claim is: allowing any incompetent
person – ignorant, morally unreasonable, or one who uses an unacceptable procedure to
decide – creates injustice. It unfairly disadvantages incompetent people who can be ruled
out by various methods.
The set of disqualified incompetent people have a legitimate complaint: they are
equally unacceptable as voter as people who were not disqualified, but one group is
allowed to vote. This is unfair to disqualified people. If the unfairness the disqualified
voters face is greater than the injustice the general population faces when incompetent
people vote, then we must choose the lesser injustice. Perhaps this comparison will force
us to let all incompetent people vote.
Demographics of a Knowledge Exam
I have just shown that disqualifying some incompetent people, rather than as
many as possible, is unfair to the disenfranchised. Despite this, Brennan might argue it is
still preferable to restrict the electorate where possible, since ruling out some incompetent
people creates a better voting population. Knowledge exams might be useful here.
Restricting the electorate in any manner, though, creates a serious demographic worry,
and I want to argue that using a knowledge examination will consistently disenfranchise
certain groups, such as the poor and less educated. A knowledge exam will tend to
produce a restricted electorate with observable demographic tendencies that differ from
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the overall population. The restricted electorate could also have empirically latent
features that negatively impact its voting ability.
Restricting the electorate based on political knowledge will disadvantage poor and
less educated citizens. While this outcome is not intrinsically unfair, I will use the
demographic objection to argue that such a restricted electorate could make empirically
worse political decisions, rather than the better decisions Brennan believes they will
choose. This point counters his implicit argument that restricted electorates create better
voting outcomes.
While morally unreasonable citizens will likely be found in all race, age, and
socioeconomic groups, ignorant people tend to share a similar background. Ignorance
about politics stems from a lack of education, often found in poor communities. While a
citizen can overcome low levels of education by studying for a knowledge exam, not
everyone has the time or the money to invest in such a procedure. Thus, knowledge
exams will likely disqualify an unusually high percentage of poor and low educated
citizens.
Although the restricted electorate might generally tend to make empirically better
political decisions, using a knowledge exam to determine who may vote distorts the
electorate’s educational and socioeconomic demographics. The restricted electorate will
likely not know what matters to the disenfranchised, who have similar interests based on
characteristics they share (which also happen to make them unfit to vote). Even if the
members of the restricted electorate attempt to discern what the disenfranchised need,
that voting population will be unable to accurately anticipate what the poor and low
educated want and most require to flourish. The restricted electorate, which is supposed
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to make better decisions since its members are more knowledgeable about politics than
the population as a whole, could make worse political decisions than the general
population, particularly on issues that directly affect the disenfranchised. The restricted
electorate might also have some empirically latent feature that causes the body to make
worse political decisions all the time, which directly refutes Brennan’s claim that
restricted electorates make better political decisions.
Based on these arguments, I conclude that restricting the electorate using a
knowledge exam creates a voting body with different demographics than the general
population. This means that the electorate will make empirically worse political decisions
at least some of the time, and it is possible that a restricted electorate with empirically
latent features might make worse decisions all the time. These claims cast doubt on
Brennan’s conclusion that restricted electorates produce better political decisions.
The Subjugation Worry
Implementing either the IAT or a knowledge exam would likely create a group of
people who were unable to pass one exam, and so would never be allowed to vote. Since
I have argued against the moral reasonableness of the IAT, I will set that exam aside and
focus on knowledge exams; however, I believe my argument would apply to the IAT as
well.
Voting gives a citizen a say in how she will be governed. Generally, we accept
that people have the right to make decisions about their own lives. Voting also gives a
citizen coercive power over others’ lives in addition to one’s own, so Brennan argues it is
unjust to allow incompetent people to make decisions about others’ lives. The
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subjugation worry counters that it is especially unjust to permanently prevent a citizen
from weighing in on decisions about his own life.
Consider the comparison Brennan makes between voting age requirements and
restricted suffrage. Most people do not think voting age requirements are very unjust,
even if they prevent some competent young people from voting (and so making decisions
about their own lives). Voting age requirements end: eventually, a citizen will be allowed
to vote just because she grows older. At some point any citizen can participate in
constructing the coercive decisions by which she must abide. Permanent subjugation, on
the other hand, never offers citizens this option.
If I did not receive a good education, and do not have the money and time to
supplement what I do not already know with outside studying, I am effectively cut off
from participating in a decision-making process that directly coerces me. I will never be
able to participate in political decision-making. While it is unfair to subject other people
to my vote if I am an incompetent voter, it is unfair to me to permanently subject me to
the decisions of others, when I have no avenue to join the decision-making body as a
competent member. I have the right to make decisions about my own life. If my society
uses an exam that I can never pass, permanently disenfranchising me, this is much more
unjust than voting age requirements, which only temporarily restrict my decision-making
ability.
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CONCLUSION
This final section will detail the consequences of three factors Brennan did not
include in his initial comparison of restricted and universal electorates. He noted that both
universal and restricted voting systems are unjust, and argued that universal suffrage is
the more unjust system. His explicit argument compared restricted suffrage to voting age
limits, which most societies utilize and do not consider very unjust, even though they
disenfranchise some competent people. He implicitly argued that restricting the electorate
produces better political decisions. So he favors restricted voting over universal suffrage.
In chapter two, I argued that restricting the voting population with knowledge
exams unfairly disadvantages people with low political knowledge in two ways. Both
morally unreasonable citizens and those with low knowledge are incompetent and should
not vote. Restricting the electorate with a knowledge exam only disenfranchises part of
the incompetent segment of the population. It is unfair that some incompetent people are
allowed to vote, while others are not simply due to the nature of their incompetence.
Brennan did not consider the unfairness inherent in this kind of restricted electorate.
It seems, then, that in order to avoid such unfairness within the restricted
electorate, society must test a potential voter’s morals in addition to her knowledge. The
IAT, while not perfect, would disqualify many people who are morally unreasonable.
However, the ethical costs of the exam are unacceptably high for a government to require
of its citizens in order to vote, and so I ruled out using the IAT. Using only a knowledge
exam, though, will create an electorate with a demographic bias towards the rich and
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well-educated. This group, even if it attempts to, might not be able to make the best
political decisions for the poor and less educated, who are disproportionately deemed
incompetent by a knowledge exam. Further, it is possible that the restricted electorate
will have some empirically latent feature, which means it will make worse political
decisions than an electorate that matches the general population demographically. If the
restricted electorate makes empirically worse political decisions than a universal voting
body would at least some of the time, and perhaps always, Brennan cannot justify a
restricted electorate by saying it would produce better political outcomes.
Finally, I worry that any kind of exam will permanently disenfranchise some
segment of the population. These people will never be able to pass the exam (no matter
which exam society implements), and so will never be able to vote. Since voting gives a
citizen the ability to weigh in on political decisions that pertain to her own life, it is
especially unfair to permanently disenfranchise any group, much more unfair than
temporary restrictions like voting age requirements.
These arguments refute Brennan’s outcome-based justification of restricted
suffrage, and provide two new considerations of unfairness when restricting the electorate.
Including them shows that restricting the electorate is more unjust than Brennan initially
thought. I conclude, contrary to Brennan, that restricted suffrage is more unjust than
universal suffrage. Therefore, we should grant voting rights to all citizens.
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